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Abstract: Tracing an early rabbinic approach to the human, this article analyzes 
how the Tannaim of the Mishnah and Tosefta set the human side by side with other 
species, and embedded their account within broader considerations of reproduc-
tion, zoology and species crossings. The human here emerges at the intersection 
of menstrual purity law and Temple sacrificial law in the tractates of Niddah and 
Bekhorot and is part of a reproductive biology that sought to determine the bound-
aries and overlaps between species. This rabbinic biology ought to be understood 
amid ancient conversations about what constitutes a proper member of a species, in 
terms of reproduction, resemblance and variation. The article shows how, even as it 
disavows genealogical links between humans and animals (and indeed across other 
species), rabbinic reproductive biology nonetheless implicates humans among and 
as animals.
Key words: Rabbinic science of reproduction; likeness; bodily variation; species.
Introduction
The idea in Gen 1:26 of humans as created “in the image of God” has 
loomed large in Jewish and Christian discourse. In the realms of theology, 
philosophy, and politics, the tselem elohim retains its potent ability to under-
pin diverse and contradictory “Judeo-Christian” positions. The divinizing 
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290 Rachel Neis JSQ 
notion of the human is enlisted to call for both inclusion and exclusion on 
the basis of variation across sexuality, gender, animality, race, and (dis)abil-
ity. Examples abound: from the Jubilee Vatican Committee’s statement on 
people with disabilities,1 to the United Church of Christ calling for sup-
port for the Black Lives Matter movement;2 from Ted Cruz inveighing 
against same-sex marriage,3 to an Orthodox Jewish rabbi advocating for 
the inclusion of LGBT people;4 and from Barack Obama urging for health 
justice,5 to the second principle of the Texas Republican Party’s Platform, 
which establishes the sanctity of “innocent human life … from fertilization 
to natural death.”6
While being dubbed an image of God (tselem elohim) may endow certain 
entities (e. g., zygotes) with “sanctity,” exclusion from this category (on the 
basis of animalized, raced, gendered, sexed or disability-related variation) 
may result in naturalized violence.7 Hitler’s Mein Kampf described Jews as 
“an embodied protest against the aesthetics of the image of God.”8 Con-
demning the offspring of interracial marriage, it called for “images of God 
and not deformities half man and half ape.”9 Here, the imago dei undergirds 
racial purity and is set against disabled, animalized and racialized others.
In these examples, the logics of tselem elohim link or oppose quite differ-
ent entities (from reproductive material to non-humans to LGBTQ people) 
in multivariate ways. These cases vividly display the material consequences 
for life, death, disposal and value when we set the human over other entities, 
or describe certain entities as non-human, animal or “mere” material. The 
hierarchical binary of human and non-human based in tselem elohim finds 
1 www.vatican.va/jubilee_2000/jubilevents/jub_disabled_20001203_scheda5_en.htm.
2 See www.ucc.org/justice_racism_black_lives_matter; also “Black Lives Matter Imago 




4 Harvey Belovski, www.keshetuk.org/uploads/1/3/8/6/13861493/keshetuk_factsheet_
denominations_a3spreads.pdf.
5 See www.obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/06/09/remarks-presid 
ent-catholic-health-association-conference.
6 See www.texasgop.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/PERM-PLATFORM.pdf.
7 E. g., toward animals; see Peter Singer, “Prologue, Ethics and the New Animal Libera-
tion Movement,” In Defence of Animals, ed. Peter Singer (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985) 2–3.
8 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans. Ralph Manheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998) 
178.
9 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 402. Compare Mel Chen, Animacies (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2012) 89–126, on John Austin’s discussion of marriage (which, without a speech 














































24 (2017) The Reproduction of Species 291
support in a long tradition of commentary that upholds a transcendent 
notion of the divine, with corollary dualisms of humanity and animality, 
heaven and earth, soul and body, mind and matter, and man and woman.
We find cautions against uncritical humanisms, related to some of the 
problems in the foregoing examples, in posthumanist scholarship, animal 
studies, feminist science studies, disability studies and feminist new materi-
alisms.10 In differing ways, these scholarly and philosophical approaches 
tend to de-emphasize the kinds of dualisms just mentioned (including those 
of agency/passivity; living/dead; human/non-human), while re-centering 
or blurring the differences between human and non-human.11 In Jewish 
studies scholarship, we find a more recent modulation of an earlier tendency 
to go to rabbinic notions of the human solely for “high” or spiritualizing 
(and self-congratulatory) reflection on the tselem elohim and to cast the 
tselem elohim as a distinctive contribution to humanity’s self-conception.12 
This has been effected partly by not shying away from the implications of 
the notion of the divine body.13 Yet, even these more materialist versions 
give an embodied twist to what is nonetheless a species-exclusive approach 
to the human.14
10 See, e. g., Chen, Animacies; Rosie Braidotti, Posthuman (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2013); Cary Wolfe, “Human, All Too Human,” PMLA 124, no. 2 (2009) 564–575; Mira 
J. Hird, “Biologically Queer,” in Ashgate Companion to Queer Theory, ed. N. Giffney 
and M. O’Rourke (Aldershot: Ashgate Press, 2009) 347–362; Diana Coole and Saman-
tha Frost, eds., New Materialisms (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010); Donna 
Haraway, When Species Meet (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007).
11 On non-human entities, such as bacteria, and their enfolding within the human, see, 
e. g., Myra Hird, “Animal Transex,” Australian Feminist Studies 21, no. 49 (2006) 35–50, 
and Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010) 12, 23, 48, 
112, 120. Braidotti considers the possibilities in the techno-scientific present, which 
“writes hybridity into our social and symbolic sphere and as such it challenges all 
notions of purity”; Transpositions (Polity, 2006) 99.
12 E. g., Alexander Altmann, “‘Homo Imago Dei’ in Jewish and Christian Theology,” 
Journal of Religion 48 (1968) 235–259; Yaakov (Gerald) Blidstein, “Great Is Human 
Dignity,” Shenaton ha-Mishpat ha-Ivri 9–10 (1982–83) 127–185.
13 E. g., Yair Lorberbaum, In God’s Image (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015); 
Rachel Neis, The Sense of Sight in Rabbinic Culture: Jewish Ways of Seeing in Late 
Antiquity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Daniel Boyarin, “Gender,” 
in Critical Terms for Religious Studies, ed. Mark C. Taylor (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1998) 117–136; Jonathan W. Schofer, “The Image of God,” Journal of 
the Society for Textual Reasoning 4/3 (2006); Alon Goshen Gottstein, “The Body as 
Image of God in Rabbinic Literature,” Harvard Theological Review 12 (1996) 137–162.
14 However, Schofer finds the rabbis disrupting expected, hierarchical binaries of beast/
angel as residing in the body of the human. See Jonathan W. Schofer, “The Beastly 
Body in Rabbinic Self-Formation,” in Religion and the Self in Antiquity, ed. D. Brakke, 













































292 Rachel Neis JSQ 
I seek to offer an alternative: tracing an early rabbinic approach to the 
human, I  show how the Tannaim set the human side by side with other 
species and consider a range of bodily variation. They embed this account 
of humans and other species in broader considerations of reproduction, 
embryology and zoology. What emerges is a thinking about humanness 
through a rabbinic “biology” that seeks to determine the boundaries and – 
more importantly  – the overlaps between species. This rabbinic biology 
partakes in ancient conversations about what constitutes a proper member 
of a species, in terms of reproduction, resemblance and variation.
The evidence for a cross-species and bodily-variant account of the 
human clusters in the tractates Niddah and Bekhorot.15 While the sources 
in Niddah treat the human fetus amid various materials emitted from a 
woman’s uterus, those in Bekhorot discuss variant human and non-human 
animal bodies. Both tractates consider cases of cross-species offspring.16 In 
making the case for a broader “rabbinic biology,” I show how these two sets 
of deliberations are profoundly interrelated, just as they are in Aristotle and 
Galen. This allows us to side-step some noted contemporary reflexes (as 
related to liveness, death and reproductive politics).17 And by drawing on 
classical rabbinic thought, I hope to upend the facility with which the so-
called Judeo-Christian tradition is often rhetorically deployed.
I begin by laying out some of the stakes in ancient “scientific” conver-
sations about “generation” and briefly consider ancient science and rabbinic 
literature in light of critical and feminist science studies.18 I then turn to the 
15 I cite the Mishnah according to Shishah Sidre Mishnah, ed. H. Albeck (Jerusalem: 
Mosad Bialik, 1957–59) and the Tosefta according to Tosefta Kifeshuta, ed. Saul Lieber-
man (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1962) or Tosephta, ed. M. S. Zucker-
mandel (Jerusalem: Wahrman, 1970).
16 By “cross-species” offspring, I  refer to cases where two parents of species X delivers 
an entity that resembles species Y. These are entities whose species-appearance is de 
novo and does not derive from their parents. By “interspecies” offspring, I refer to the 
offspring of two different species (species X and Y) that manifests hybrid features (X 
and Y) or resembles the male parent (Y) (the rabbinic term for such entities is kil aʿyim). 
Interspecies and cross-species offspring may look the same.
17 On the mixed effects of life-centered rhetoric, anthropocentric individualism and the 
“technologically bio-mediated” present, see Braidotti, Posthuman, 105–42.
18 The term “generation” conveys the ancient meanings of creating, bearing, and beget-
ting implied in Greek, Latin, (gennao and generare) and Hebrew (y-l-d). These can 
refer to male or female dimensions of procreation (e. g., Gen 4:1 and 5:3) and beyond 
(e. g., Gen 2:4, heaven and earth). Daryl McGowan Tress notes “the contrast between 
modern concepts of reproduction leaning on metaphors of production and manu-
facture of artifacts, and the ancient focus on procreation and begetting of living things 
as a process which occurs in a larger natural nexus”; D. M. Tress, “Metaphysical Science 













































24 (2017) The Reproduction of Species 293
sources in Niddah and Bekhorot, focusing on their shared concerns with 
creaturely classification, as part of a broader rabbinic reproductive biology. 
I  close with a discussion of two key instances in these tractates where 
attempts to distinguish the human founder, arguing that, even as it disavows 
genealogical links between humans and animals, rabbinic reproductive 
biology implicates humans among and as animals.
1. Ancient reproductive science
1.1. Sources from Antiquity
The author-compiler of Problems19 has a strict criterion by which he assesses 
materials that emerge from the human body: likeness.20 Deviations are not 
offspring, making uterine entities “called monsters” born of “corrupted 
seed” the same as “worms” generated by excrement.21 Only “uncorrupted 
seed” produces something that “comes to be naturally like” the source: “if 
from a horse, a horse; if from a human, a human.”22 Materials are thus dis-
tinguished by their derivation or deviation from the right kind of mate-
rial, which is what ensures a strictly mimetic likeness, whether in terms 
of species identity (human or animal) or able-bodiedness (the same, or a 
monster).
K. Ward (New York: Routledge, 1996) 33 (and see 32). On the emergence of the con-
cept of “reproduction” in the mid-19th century (and its association with mechanized 
replication) instead of “generation,” see Nick Hopwood et al., “Introduction: Com-
municating Reproduction,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 89 (2015) 380, 384.
19 Pseudo-Aristotle, Problems, ed. and trans. Robert Mayhew (Loeb Classical Library 
[LCL]), vol. 316).
20 See Daryn Lehoux, “Why Doesn’t My Baby Look Like Me?” in Probabilities, Hyop-
theticals, and Counterfactuals in Ancient Greek Thought, ed. Victoria Wohl (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014) 208–229. Scholars consider Problems to contain 
the work of more than one author and to have been redacted in late antiquity. See 
Ps. Aristotle, Problems 4, 878a 1–4: “Why, if the animal is born from our seed, is it 
our offspring, but if it comes from some other part or excretion, it is not ours? For 
many things come to be from what is putrefying as well as from seed. So why, then, if 
something is like us, is it more our own, but if it is like another, it is not?”
21 See Ps. Aristotle, Problems 4, 878a 20–24; Lehoux, “Baby,” 210.
22 Ps. Aristotle, Problems 4, 878 a1–3 and 878a 20–28. Compare these questions and 
distinctions to t. Bekhorot 1:5–13, whose topics range from classifying cross-species 
births to excretions and varieties of nested entities (e. g., honey from bees, to fish eggs 
within the fish, to fish swallowed by other fish). Cf. Aristotle’s repeated maxim “the 
human generates the human” and D. M. Balme, “Anthropos anthropon gennai,” in 













































294 Rachel Neis JSQ 
Not all ancient thinkers took such a hard line. Aristotle, whose single-
seed theory of generation continued to be influential in late antiquity, in 
some ways had a tighter notion of what likeness should consist: resem-
blance to the male parent.23 Deviations from this, beginning with female 
progeny, were steps toward monstrosity,24 but even extreme dissemblance – 
a delivery that “no longer has the appearance of a human being at all, but 
that of an animal only” – was still properly called offspring.25 For Aristotle, 
resemblance was tied to male seed: male seed acted upon female matter 
(blood), imparting form to it, and it was the failure of the seed to master the 
material that caused deviation.26 We see how gender, animality, disability 
and materiality combine in Aristotle’s reproductive system.27
While Galen, a contemporary of the Tannaim, drew from the Hippo-
cratic two-seed theory in which both parents contribute seed, he followed 
Aristotle in accepting species nonconformity as offspring and as variation 
within same-species reproduction.28 Others, such as Pliny and Soranus, sug-
gested that variation or “misshapenness,” including species nonconformity, 
23 Aristotle, Generation of Animals 767b–769b, ed. A. L. Peck (LCL, vol. 336). Compare 
Gen 5:3, in which Adam “begets” a son in his image and likeness (no Eve, no “male 
and female” entity per Gen 1:26).
24 Aristotle, GA 767b 8–10.
25 Aristotle, GA 769b 8–11 (and 767b 5–7). The animal (zōon) is more general than the 
more individual characteristic of human.
26 See E. Bianchi, who argues that an active/passive dualistic hierarchy for Aristotle’s 
theory of generation overlooks the role of “unruly” female matter which (necessarily) 
disrupts the reproductive process; Feminine Symptom (New York: Fordham University, 
2014).
27 On this section of Generation of Animals as “the founding association of femaleness 
and disability,” see Rosemarie Garland Thomson, Extraordinary Bodies (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2017) 19–20, 27–28. See also her “Integrating Disability, 
Transforming Feminist,” NWSA Journal 14 (2002) 1–32, in which she argues that “fem-
inist disability theory presses us to ask what kinds of knowledge might be produced 
through having a body radically marked by its own particularity, a body that materi-
alizes at the ends of the curve of human variation” (20) and shows the links between 
“medicalization” and aesthetics (10–12).
28 See Michael Boylan, “Galen’s Conception Theory,” Journal of the History of Biology 
19 (1986) 47–77; see p. 67 on female matter (in addition to seed) conferring features 
and species identity, per Galen, On the Seed 2.2. Galen, Aristotle and others thought 
through human reproduction in parallel to animal reproduction, assuming parallels 
between animal and human systems; see Wilberding, “Embryology,” Companion to 
Science, Technology, and Medicine in Ancient Greece and Rome, ed. Georgia L. Irby 
(LOC: Wiley Blackwell, 2016) 331. In Usefulness of the Parts of the Body 3.1, Galen 
rejected the possibility of centaurs (horse-human hybrids) due to the impossibility of 
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was the result of sense-impressions during conception.29 Vision thus 
interrupted processes of generation as replicating likenesses, introducing 
instead “mimetic dissemblance.”30 In Soranus’ example, women who gazed 
at monkeys during conception delivered monkey-like infants.31
Another explanation for species nonconformity was inter-breeding. 
While admitting that bodily variation including species nonconformity or 
hybridity occurs, Aristotle and Galen denied that these creatures were the 
outcome of inter-breeding (due to gestational differences): such cases were 
“resemblances only.”32 Pliny was ambiguous, citing both individual and 
racial cases of animal-human hybridity in his discussions of “monstrous” 
births and “monstrous races,” including one report of offspring born to 
Indians who mated with animals.33
These samples of late ancient theories of reproduction all revolve around 
a fixation on resemblance (or “mimetic dissemblance”), though they differ 
on how likeness comes to be and on how to explain and classify dissem-
blance. Their thinking through of these processes not only crosses issues 
of gender and (dis)ability (or “monstrosity”), but also dovetails with those 
regarding species identity and race. As we will see, the Tannaim entertained 
similar concerns about likeness and variation, but were far less preoccu-
pied with seed or the mechanics of generation. This is in contrast to later 
rabbinic texts.34 In Tannaitic sources, we find few references to the notion 
29 See Soranus, Gynecology, 1:39 and 1:47. In his edition, Owsei Temkin (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994) 37–38 and 48 renders both kakamorphos and 
amorphos as “misshapen.” Soranus just mentions women; Pliny, Natural History 7.52 
refers to either parent’s sensory impressions. Versions of this idea can be found in 
Heliodorus, Aethiopica 4.8; Galen, De hist. phil. 116 and De Theriaca ad Pisonem. See 
Rachel Neis, Sense of Sight, 36, 39, 131–137, 159–166 (and sources there).
30 See Éric Michaud, “Potent Image,” Res: Anthropology and Aesthetics 65–66 (2015) 
364–374.
31 Soranus, Gynecology, 1:39.
32 Aristotle, GA 769b18–19.
33 Examples of “races”: Pliny, Nat. Hist. 7:23 and 7:30; examples of individual cases: Nat. 
Hist. 7:32–34, women who birthed elephants or snakes, and hybrid births (such as a 
hippocentaur, whose body Pliny viewed). See Mary Beagon, The Elder Pliny on the 
Human Animal: Natural History, Book 7 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005) 46–47.
34 E. g. Leviticus Rabbah 14:6, 9; y. Kilaʾim 8:4, 31c; b. Niddah 31a–b: These later sources 
name three “partners” who contribute different elements to the fetus: human female, 
male, and God. Gwynn Kessler treats primarily Amoraic sources on embryology, con-
textualizing them in light of Greco-Roman gynecology and embryology while arguing 
that the Amoraim used embryos to think through Israel’s relationship with God (Con-
ceiving Israel, 77–126). She also notes how Leviticus Rabbah 14 elevates God’s role in 
procreation but “disassociates sexual intercourse,” parents and reproductive fluids from 
it (123). See also Reuven Kipperwasser, “‘Three Partners in a Person’,” lectio difficilior 













































296 Rachel Neis JSQ 
that humans owe their origin to a “drop,” a reference to male seed.35 In the 
most elaborate text we find echoes of Aristotle, but instead of the male seed 
actively imprinting the female material with form, the only player is God, 
who works male seed into a fetus that has “his father’s form.”36 Besides these 
few exceptions, Tannaitic texts embed considerations of likeness and vari-
ation of offspring into the sources in Niddah and Bekhorot discussed below, 
which focus far more on the shape and features of the offspring itself.
1.2. Situating science
When situating Niddah and Bekhorot alongside ancient scientific, philo-
sophical and other genres of Greek and Latin thought, and in staking out 
a rabbinic biology, I  do so in light of insights from feminist and critical 
science studies and history of science.The former have taught us to unpack 
claims of authority, neutrality and objectivity in modern science. His-
torians of science, and scholars of ancient Greek and Latin sources among 
them, have critiqued anachronistic and narrow understandings of science 
that restrict its domain to what is now considered scientific, and instead 
expand the field to encompass “the whole industry of ancient knowledge-
ordering.”37 Whereas moderns might separate law from medicine, “ancient 
writers clearly thought about all of these bodies of expertise as part of a 
spectrum of different fields of knowledge.”38 Thus, rather than aspiring to a 
Metsia 84a consider visual impressions on the fetus. See further, Neis, Sense of Sight, 
129–35, 154–55.
35 These are m. Avot 3:1 (tipah serukhah, “a putrid drop”); Midrash Tannaim on Deut 32:2 
(tipah shelzenut, “a drop of promiscuity”); and Mekhilta deRabbi Ishmael, Beshallah, 8 
(tipah shel mayim, “a drop of water”). The more common “emission of seed” (shikhvat 
zerah, Lev 15:16) in Tannaitic sources is not explicitly related to reproduction (e. g., m. 
Niddah 4:1; t. Niddah 2:8–9; t. Zavim 2:4, 6); some sources talk of it being discharged 
by a woman (e. g., m. Miqvaot 8:4).
36 Mekhilta deRabbi Ishmael, Beshallah, 8; cf. Mekhilta deRabbi Shimon bar Yohai 19 and 
20. Not only is the male parent’s role taken over by God, but no mother is mentioned 
(see Kessler, Conceiving Israel, 14–16, 78, 82, 104).
37 On “science” across genres, see Emma Gee, “Greece and Rome,” in Routledge Com-
panion to Literature and Science, ed. Bruce Clarke and Manuela Rossini (London: 
Routledge: 2011) 409–422. On the mismatch of modern distinctions between science 
and other subjects for analyzing ancient knowledge-production, the interlacing of 
“theology” and “science,” and interpreting “all those silly monsters” in ancient Roman 
sources, see Daryn Lehoux, What Did the Romans Know? (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2014) 8–15.
38 Jason König, “Self-Assertion and Its Alternatives in Ancient Scientific and Technical 
Writing,” in Authority and Expertise in Ancient Scientific Culture, ed. Jason König 
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positivist, evaluative or teleological account of rabbinic “sciences” that seeks 
either to restore them to a reified canon of ancient science or to reject them 
as unworthy participants because of their religious nature, I join those who 
are opening up what can be included in the realm of “science” and various 
forms of knowledge production.39
Historicizing science goes hand in hand with the investigation of the 
gendered, social and political contexts of knowledge-making. Thus, the 
encyclopedic genres of knowledge in Pliny’s Natural History can be under-
stood within the contexts of Roman imperialism.40 It is possible to similarly 
approach the political, social and gendered contexts of rabbinic content 
without simply going to Greco-Roman sources to fill in the gaps in the more 
laconic Tannaitic sources, or viewing the rabbis as “influenced” rather than 
as engaged.41 We may then take seriously the discursive contexts and forms 
of rabbinic science, even – or especially – if they are rather different from 
those in Greco-Roman writings. Instead of evaluating rabbinic writings 
by juxtaposition to “canonical” scientific sources and concluding that the 
former contain rabbinic rulings (halakhah) rather than science (or that 
the science is incidental rather than significant), we may ask what impact 
rabbinic forms have on the content itself.42 Part of answering this question 
making, particularly of “natural philosophy,” is taken in Lehoux, Romans. For nuanced 
considerations on the difficulties with using modern “science” to write about ancient 
sources, see Markus Asper, Writing Science (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013) 4–5, and Roger 
French, Ancient Natural History (London: Routledge, 1994) x–xiii.
39 For two among many examples of laudatory or apologetic evaluation of rabbinic 
science, see Samuel Kottek, “Medicine in the Talmud,” in Encyclopaedia of the History 
of Science, Technology, and Medicine in Non-Western Cultures, ed. Helaine Selin (Dor-
drecht: Kluwer Academic, 1997) 714–17, and Norman Solomon, “Natural Sciences 
in Judaism,” Encyclopedia of Sciences and Religions, ed. Anne L. C. Runehov and Lluis 
Oviedo (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2013) 1404–1414. For an important correc-
tive to such approaches, alongside a historiographical and methodological reflection, 
see Annette Reed, “‘Ancient Jewish Sciences’ and the Historiography of Judaism,” in 
Ancient Jewish Science and the History of Knowledge in Second Temple Literature, ed. 
Jonathan Ben-Dov and Seth Sanders (New York: New York University Press, 2014) 
195–254.
40 See Trevor Murphy, Pliny the Elder’s Natural History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004), and Jason König and Tim Whitmarsh, Ordering Knowledge in the Roman Empire 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
41 Pace Giuseppe Veltri, “On the Influence of ‘Greek Wisdom’,” Jewish Studies Quarterly 
5 (1998) 300–317. Thanks to Peggy McCracken for helping me think through some of 
these issues.
42 Rabbinic “sciences” are often described as fragmentary, incidental or subordinate to the 
real purpose of halakhic determinations; see, e. g., Markham Geller, Akkadian Healing 
Therapies in the Babylonian Talmud (Max Planck Institute for the History of Science 













































298 Rachel Neis JSQ 
involves considering the political situation of the rabbis who were making 
the science of human and animal reproduction their own in both Roman 
and Jewish social contexts. And considerations of gender are bound up 
with these contexts, not least when considering the politics of reproductive 
science.
1.3. Feminist Science Studies
Charlotte Fonrobert has modelled how one might undertake this kind of 
analysis, in her study of the tractate of Niddah as a “science of blood” along-
side Greco-Roman gynecological theories, while attending to the ways in 
which rabbinic concerns about purity and gender substantively shape this 
science.43 She and Gwynn Kessler have shown how the rabbinic “sciences” 
of menstruation and embryology encode gendered notions of bodies, Jew-
ishness and divinity.44 My investigation of the science related to uterine 
contents and reproduction complements their work. Their attention to how 
rabbis built their authority by inventing a science of blood and gynecology 
(Fonrobert), and how they elided women in favor of developing fetuses as a 
theological model (Kessler), moves us here to consider how the rabbis built 
a science of species on the reproductive materials of women and animals 
(while maintaining the elision of the female reproductive body).
Unlike Fonrobert and Kessler, I  do not focus solely on human cases: 
my argument is precisely about the strong links – and potential overlaps – 
between human and animal reproductive biology (of which uterine entities 
in Niddah are only a part). While the rabbis undo species separatism in 
their consideration of cross-species possibilities  – a move that feminist 
science studies and queer and transgender studies scholars such as Donna 
Haraway, Myra Hird and Eva Hayward might embrace – the rabbis’ linking 
of women’s uterine contents to animal reproduction does not, of course, 
Geller and others draw between science in rabbinic literature as “purely coincidental 
and serendipitous” and the “full medical text” in Greco-Roman sources oversimplifies 
tractates like Niddah, Bekhorot and Kilʿayim, in which gynecology, embryology, and 
zoology are purposefully germane. The concerns of purity law, temple offerings, 
farming and dietary laws framing such material are important but not oppositional.
43 See Charlotte Fonrobert, Menstrual Purity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000) 
103–127.
44 Fonrobert, Menstrual Purity; Gwynn Kessler, Conceiving Israel (Philadelphia: Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Press, 2009). On Greco-Roman medicine, authority and gender, 
see, e. g., Helen King, Hippocrates’ Woman (London: Routledge, 1998), and Rebecca 
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mean that considerations of gender and other political contexts must fall 
away.45 Part of our considering the social, racial and political shaping 
of rabbinic knowledge formation about humanness, bodily variation, 
animality and reproduction, entails understanding how gender structures 
and is structured by these same enterprises.46 Making a rabbinic science of 
generation through the ritual filters of niddah (menstruation) and bekhorot 
(firstborns) is not a neutral or casual intellectual project. Reproductive 
knowledge of humans and animals would have been particularly vital to 
the minority Jewish population; claiming its mastery is a bold move for the 
Tannaim.
 In the case of uterine emissions and potential fetuses, the reproductive 
capacity of women’s bodies, or failures thereof, become an occasion to for-
mulate not only a human reproductive science but also a broader biology. 
The gendered, rhetorical framing that the rabbis use to “produce” humans 
in Niddah preserves woman as a grammatical subject (“she who expels”) 
but tends to elide her in favor of scrutinizing her emissions. There is thus a 
gendered division of “labor” at the heart of the rabbinic concept of human 
generation: “she who expels” versus the rabbis who scrutinize the uterine 
product.47 Paralleling this is the way that the reproductive science of animals 
45 “Species, like the body, are internally oxymoronic, full of their own others, full of mess-
mates, of companions. Every species is a multi-species crowd. Human exceptionalism 
is what companion species cannot abide”; Haraway, When Species, 165. For different 
ideas about generation, regeneration, contagion and interspecies possibilities, see also 
Haraway, Companion Species Manifesto (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2003); 
Myra Hird, “Animal Transex,”Australian Feminist Studies 21,49 (2006) 35–50; Eva 
Hayward, “Lessons from a Starfish,” in Queering the Non/Human, ed. Noreen Giffney 
and Myra J. Hird (Burlington: Ashgate, 2008) 249–263.
46 On race and bodily variation, see Maja Kominko, “Monsters and Barbarians in Late 
Antiquity,” in Routledge Handbook of Identity and the Environment in the Classical 
and Medieval Worlds, ed. Rebecca Futo Kennedy and Molly Jones-Lewis (London: 
Routledge, 2016) 373–389; also Robert Garland, “Invention and Application of Racial 
Deformity,” in Kennedy and Jones-Lewis, Identity and the Environment, 45–61. On the 
imperial (bio)politics of scientific knowledge, see Susan Mattern, Prince of Medicine 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2013) 30 (child mortality), 120–6 (Roman dem-
ographics). Fonrobert shows how uterine blood science operates beyond gender, to 
further rabbinic conceptions of Jewish (e. g., rabbinic, Samaritan), para-Jewish (e. g., 
Samaritan) and non-Jewish identity; “Blood and Law,” Henoch 30 (2008) 243–266.
47 There are exceptions: m. Niddah 3:2 and t. Niddah 4:2 describe a female subject who 
submerges or crushes what she has expelled. However, t. Niddah 4:1 has plural mas-
culine subjects tearing a fleshy mass, and t. Niddah 4:11 has masculine plural subjects 
immersing a fetal sac in oil, not water, by the light of the sun or tearing it (t. Niddah 
4:12). In t. Niddah 4:3–4 two case reports describe rabbis referring women who expel 
small items to doctors in (who then affirm the Tosefta’s general diagnosis – a curious 
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in Bekhorot arises in the context of the consumptive economies of both the 
Temple and humans. In other words, analyses of gender and animality come 
together in terms of rabbinic conceptualizations of the death (miscarriages, 
slaughter) and life of different kinds of uterine material.
2. Reproducing Species in Niddah and Bekhorot
In Niddah and Bekhorot considerations about reproduction are posed both 
in terms of creaturely classification and resemblance and in terms of cross-
species deliveries.
m. Niddah 3:2b: One who expels (hamapelet)48 something like a kind of (ke-min) 
domesticated animal, wild animal or bird, whether pure or impure – if it is male 
she should sit [out the days of impurity] for a male, and if female she should sit 
for a female: the words of R. Meir. And the sages say: Anything that does not have 
something of human form is not a valid delivery.
m. Bekhorot 1:2a: A cow that delivers (sheyaldah) something like a kind of (ke-min) 
donkey or a donkey that delivers something like a kind of (ke-min) horse  – it is 
exempt from the laws of firstborn. For it is written firstborn donkey (Exod 34:20) 
and firstborn donkey (Exod 13:13). [This means that both] the one birthing must be 
a donkey, and the one born must be a donkey.
These two scenarios each envision one kind (min) expelling or delivering 
an entity that looks like another kind (whether non-living, as in the human 
scenario of Niddah, or living, as in the animal scenario of Bekhorot: 
hamapelet vs. sheyaldah).
The Niddah source is situated in a list of a variety of materials that are 
expelled from a woman’s uterus (m. Niddah 3:1–7). Following the initial 
determination of whether or not some of these entities are menstrual prod-
ucts (per earlier chapters in tractate and m. Niddah 3:1–2a), the task here 
is to determine whether or not certain non-living, organic materials consti-
tute a valad (a valid delivery, or offspring).49 M. Niddah 3:2b assesses these 
non-living materials as possible miscarriages (i. e., non-living humans). The 
concern is the contraction of childbirth-related impurity by the parturient; 
elsewhere in Tannaitic sources, the consequences of classifying these 
assemblages as a non-living human relate to concerns about redemption 
of the firstborn, inheritance law, postpartum sacrifices or corpse-related 
48 One could translate hamapelet as “aborts” (as in involuntary abortion).
49 Valad may be translated as fetus, embryo or offspring. The term can designate humans 
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impurity.50 Thus, the humanness or not of a uterine entity has ramified con-
sequences in various realms of ritual, personal and family law.
In the text from Bekhorot, which regulates the donation of firstborn 
animals to the Temple, the principles are drawn from biblical conceptions 
of idealized, able-bodied animals, free of blemishes, as laid out in Deut 
15:21–22 and Lev 22:18–25. Amidst its regulation of these animals, the 
tractate considers cross-species resembling births (de novo, rather than 
genuine hybrid products of interspecies breeding).51 Its formulations about 
these deliveries are strongly reminiscent of those in Mishnah Niddah. The 
question in m. Bekhorot 1:2a is whether the delivered entity is suitable for 
the Temple.
The Tannaitic considerations of uterine material in Niddah do not 
engage with the notions of liveness and value that are often posed in con-
temporary discussions. The particular occasion for scrutiny  – uterine 
material that has been miscarried – short-circuits familiar contemporary 
reflexes around personhood, life (or viability) or sanctity. The scenario in 
Niddah allows for a profoundly materialist gaze on various permutations of 
non-living organic substance, in order to contemplate what makes a human. 
This situates uterine material (as putatively human) along a continuum of 
other emissions, products and waste.52 By contrast, the animal offspring dis-
cussed in Bekhorot are living, and their liveness becomes the opportunity to 
consider the termination of life. Thereby the animal body is naturalized as 
a resource, a substance that can be converted into flesh.
50 Post-partum impurity is derived from Lev 12:2. M. Bekhorot 8:1 weighs in on which 
uterine entities count as a firstborn for the Temple and for inheritance law. In m. 
Keritot 1:1–5, 8, the question is whether a woman who delivers one of various uterine 
entities must offer (and consume) the childbirth sacrifice. M. Oholot 7:4, 7:6 and t. 
Ahilot 8:1 consider the precise moment at which a live or dead fetus conveys impurity 
(see also t. Yevamot 9:4 and 9:9).
51 Both this tractate and Kil aʿyim distinguish between interspecies offspring–offspring 
born of two different kinds (kil aʿyim) – and cross-species offspring, the de novo deliv-
ery which resembles another kind, but is not the result of interbreeding. T. Kilʿayim 
5:3 distinguishes between interspecies births that are the result of a forbidden kil aʿyim 
union and cross-species offspring. On the use of kil aʿyim offspring as bekhor see m. 
Bekhorot 1:5 and t. Bekhorot 1:13.
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2.1. Creaturely nomenclature and kinds
The cases in both Niddah and Bekhorot posit one species giving birth to an 
entity that resembles another. I argue that one must take the conceptual ter-
minology of creaturely nomenclature and kinds in both tractates seriously 
and literally. Both m. Niddah 3:2 and m. Bekhorot 1:2 (and related sources) 
focus on creaturely classification and the naming of nonhuman animals. 
In the human case, a woman delivers “something like a kind of (ke-min) 
domesticated animal, wild animal or bird (behemah, hayah, oʿf) “whether 
pure or impure” (ben tahor ben tame). The language here draws on rabbinic 
zoological terminology. The Mishnah enumerates not only its tripartite cat-
egories of animal kinds, but also pure or impure animal kinds, the latter of 
which is shorthand for more narrowly defined “species” (within the three 
higher registers of classes).
Just before our text in Niddah 3, other material entities are enumerated:
Niddah 3: (1) One who expels a piece, if there is blood with it, she is impure (as 
a menstruant), and if not she is pure. Rabbi Judah says: either way she is impure. 
(2a) One who expels something like a kind of (ke-min) peel, like a kind of (ke-min) 
barley,53 like a kind of (ke-min) dust, like a kind of (ke-min) red flies,54 let her put 
them into water. If they dissolve, she is impure, and if not she is pure. (2b) One who 
expels something like a kind of (ke-min) fish and locusts, forbidden creatures and 
creeping creatures, if there is blood with them she is impure, and if not she is pure.
These sets of solid material follow a discussion of liquid uterine materials 
of various color, hue and texture in m. Niddah 2:6–7. The passage’s pro-
gression of solid uterine materials goes from smaller organic materials and 
entities (e. g., red flies) to larger creatures (e. g., birds), and moves along 
classificatory lines related to kind or species. Creaturely entities become 
increasingly prominent as these materials coagulate into larger forms. The 
attention to the materiality of uterine products  – their solidity, solubility 
and shape – is reinforced by this progression. This attention continues into 
the remainder of the chapter, with its variety of materials from textured fetal 
53 The word is vocalized as se oʾrah (barley) in MS Kaufmann and MS Parma. The expres-
sion ke-seoʾrah (like a [grain of] barley) is used to quantify a minimal volume of bone 
or limb that could potentially convey corpse impurity (e. g., m. Keritot 3:8, m. Ohalot 
2:3).
54 Hebrew yavkhush. Albeck describes this as a type of water insect; Even-Shoshan 
defines it as a species of the mosquito family; Jastrow translates as gnat or red insect 
found in liquids. Lieberman does not translate; noting its obscure etymology, he 
glosses it “a general term for insects generated in liquids” (Saul Lieberman, “Light 
on the Cave Scrolls from Rabbinic Sources,” Proceedings of the American Academy for 
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sacs to flattened fetuses, from placentae to variant bodies and body parts. 
It is further reflected and elaborated in Tosefta Niddah and other Tannaitic 
parallels.
The descriptions of uterine materials in m. Niddah 3:1–2 deploy stand-
ard nomenclature for non-human species that is indebted to broader 
rabbinic classificatory systems. For example, the pairing “fish and locusts” 
(dagim ve-hagavim) is a stereotypical rabbinic exemplum of species of a 
smaller size that are pure and potentially permitted for consumption.55 
Conversely the pairing, “forbidden creatures and creeping creatures” 
(sheqatsim u-remasim) functions as a Tannaitic exemplar of stereotypically 
impure entities whose ingestion is forbidden.56 Also typical are the binary 
pairing wild animal versus domesticated animal and the ternary grouping 
of wild animal, domesticated animal and bird (hayah, behemah, oʿf – land 
creatures). These classes not only refer to larger creatures, but also operate 
on a higher classificatory register than more specific designations like red 
flies. Finally, m. Niddah 3:2b elaborates that the domesticated animal, wild 
animal or bird may be “pure or impure,” which is shorthand for particular 
species designations. In the Bekhorot excerpt above we have three very spe-
cific animals named: cow, donkey, and horse. The tractate not only names 
many other particular kinds, but also considers other registers (e. g., pure 
and impure kinds, smaller and larger domesticated land animals). Many 
of these rabbinic terms for creatures and classes adopt and adapt similar 
terminology in the priestly portions of Genesis 1 and Leviticus 11.57
55 Lev 11:22 marks permitted locusts with the tag lemineihu, “of its kind.” The rabbis often 
fish and locusts as a pair (e. g., t. Terumot 9:6, m. Oktsin 3:9; m. Hullin 8:1; t. Hullin 
8:2; t. Nedarim 3:5; and m. Keritot 5:1) and also often contrast them with other classes 
of animals. For various pairings and contrasts, such as fish and locusts versus fowl and 
wild animals, see t. Sotah 6:8.
56 These terms are not used in the same way in the Bible, nor are they paired. Leviticus 
describes sheqetsim as forbidden for consumption but not tame (whereas sherets des-
ignates eight forbidden and tame species), yet sheqets is applied to sherets in Lev 11:41 
and also to other creatures in Lev 11:10, 20, 23, 41–42). S; see Jacob Milgrom, “Two 
Biblical Priestly Terms,” MAARAV 6 (1992) 107–16. Remes is the general term for 
creeping things or reptiles. Sheqatsim u-remasim appear as a pair in Tannaitic literature 
(e. g., m. Shabbat 14:1). The joining of these four entities together in Tannaitic sources 
occurs only once outside of the uterine context (Mekhilta de-Rabbi Ishmael Bahodesh 
6, all mss). M. Niddah 3:2 is the only place in which this set is considered as potential 
menstrual material. The Tosefta makes no mention of this set, and in other parallels 
(m. Keritot 1:5; m. Bekhorot 8:1) these entities are ruled out as veladot. Sifra Tazria, 
Parashah 1:7 excludes these entities from transmitting childbirth impurity because 
they “do not have something of human form,” per MS. Vatican and the other mss).
57 The rabbis’ primary distinctions between wild versus domesticated animals, and 
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In addition to animal classificatory nomenclature, we find the iterated 
use of a term that is in itself about classification: min (kind). The association 
of min with various registers of creaturely nomenclature is also found in the 
organization of animal life of Genesis 1 and Leviticus 11,58 where it refers on 
the one hand to members of a group, and on the other hand to the variety 
or specificity of members within this group.59 Min operates at various reg-
isters of generality and specificity: as with Aristotle’s use of genos and eidos, 
min is logical rather than taxonomical in the modern sense.60 The rabbis 
also follow this flexible usage of min. They regularly designate creatures 
within a broader class, such as a domesticated-animal kind or a wild-animal 
kind (min behemah, min hayah),61 but may further specify by designating a 
creature as a pure or impure kind (m. Niddah 3:2b, m. Bekhorot 1:2). Min 
also features in even narrower designations, such as “fish-and-locust kind” 
(min dagim ve-hagavim, m. Niddah 3:2b) or “donkey kind” (min hamor, 
m. Bekhorot 1:2a).62
e. g., the trinaries in Gen 1:28 and in Gen 1:26; the usages of hayah and oʿf in Gen 
1:20–21. Sometimes behemah is a sub-category of the broader class of hayot (e. g., Gen 
1:24) or vice versa (e. g., Lev 1:2). See Naphtali Meshel, “Food for Thought,” Harvard 
Theological Review 101 (2008) 203–229, and Beth Berkowitz, “Animal,” in Late Ancient 
Knowing, ed. Catherine M. Chin and Moulie Vidas (Oakland: University of California 
Press, 2015) 41.
58 See Gen 1:11–25; 6:19–20; 7:14; Lev 11:14–29; Deut 14:13–18. The term min is used 
also for plant-life e. g. Genesis 1:11–12 (in Tannaitic literature see, m. Bikkurim 1:3; m. 
Bikkurim 3:9; Sifra Emor, 12, 17; m. Hallah 1:1, 2; m. Kilʿayim 2:1).
59 E. g., Gen 1:24–25 refers to the living creature brought forth from the land “according 
to its kind,” and goes on to enumerate the behemah, the hayah and the remes “according 
to their kinds.” A  greater degree of particularity is found in Leviticus 11, in which 
falcon, raven, hawk, heron, locusts and more, are described as “according to their 
kinds” (e. g., Lev 11:14–16, 19, 22, 29).
60 See Pierre Pellegrin, “Aristotle,” trans. Anthony Preuss, in Aristotle on Nature and 
Living Things, ed. Allan Gotthelf (Bristol: Bristol Classical Press, 1985) 95, in which 
genos and eidos, “far from being prefigurations of our notions of genus and species, do 
not have a biological sense: to understand their biological use, we must not lose sight 
of the rules which regulate their logical functioning.” Modern taxonomists carefully use 
graduated terms such as order, family, genus, going all the way down to species, which 
are further inflected with modern notions of evolution and heredity. However, when 
I use the term “species” instead of “kind” in discussing rabbinic texts, I mean it in the 
flexible sense of min.
61 See, e. g., m. Kilʿayim 8:6: “the wild ox is a domesticated animal kind (min behemah). 
Rabbi Yosi says, a wild animal kind (min hayah).”
62 See, e. g., m. Bava Kamma 4:2, “If an ox was an attested danger to its own kind (mino) 
but not to any other kind (mino).” For min as designating variety within kinds (what 
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2.2. X delivers/expels something like a kind of Y
The descriptive tissue of creaturely nomenclature and kind, found in both 
Niddah and Bekhorot and just examined, is not merely convenient meta-
phor. Rather, its use is deliberate because of the tractates’ concerns to clas-
sify kinds in the context of ambiguous expelled entities. This is obvious in 
m. Bekhorot 1:2 and similar cases across Bekhorot, where, as we will see, the 
determination of such entities has material consequences:
m. Bekhorot 1: (2a) A  cow that delivers something like the donkey kind (ke-min 
hamor) or a donkey that delivers something like the horse kind (ke-min sus)– it is 
exempt from the laws of the firstborn. (2b) But what about eating them? If a pure 
animal delivers something like an impure kind (ke-min temeaʿh), it is permissible to 
eat (the offspring). If an impure animal delivers something that is like a pure kind 
(min tehorah), it is forbidden to eat. For that which emerges from the impure is 
impure, and that which emerges from the pure is pure.63
The obligation of the firstborn pertains to (male) firstborns of pure kinds 
(and the donkey, which is redeemed with a pure animal).64 As mentioned, 
the classification of animals as pure or impure functions as a kind of species 
designation in and of itself (following Leviticus 11). Impure creatures are 
those kinds that transmit impurity to humans upon ingestion and are 
therefore forbidden.65 Both divine altar and human table can only accept 
properly slaughtered pure animals, but the Temple has narrower standards, 
excluding those with “blemishes” (mumim). It is on these grounds that 
m. Bekhorot 1:2a disqualifies a creature resembling a donkey-kind that is 
delivered by a cow from being offered as a firstborn.66
However, the ultimate test for this creature’s species designation is not its 
eligibility for the Temple, but rather kind as signaled by its (im)purity and 
eligibility for human ingestion. The reproductive principle is that it is the 
maternal uterus from which an animal emerges that determines its species 
identity, even in cases of dissemblance. Thus, a donkey-like creature born 
of a cow can be slaughtered and consumed, despite the fact that donkeys are 
63 M. Bekhorot 1:2, parallels in t. Bekhorot 1:6 and 1:9.
64 On the donkey firstborn, see t. Bekhorot 1:2.
65 See Christine Hayes, “Dietary Laws,” in Encyclopedia Judaica, ed. Michael Berenbaum 
and Fred Skolnik (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2007) 650–659.
66 T. Kil aʿyim 5:3 lists four cases of offspring that resemble a kind different to the birthing 
parent, using similar language: “x that delivered a kind of y.” In each case the Tosefta 
differentiates interspecies offspring (where the male parent is different to the female 
and matches the appearance of the offspring) and cross-species offspring (where both 
parents are species X and offspring looks like species Y). In the former case, the kil aʿyim 
prohibition against mating the offspring with the maternal species applies, but in the 
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impure kinds.67 If, in the case of Niddah, the designation of non-living flesh 
emitted from a human uterus affects its disposal and status (potentially as a 
corpse), then, in the case of Bekhorot, the assessment of bodily variant off-
spring triggers or prevents such once-living material’s ingestion by humans. 
Both vividly illustrate the physical literalism with which the rabbis think 
through species nonconformity. Thus kind X delivering/expelling kind Y 
(X sheyaldah/hamaplet ke-min Y) is a very concrete way through which to 
think mimetic dissemblance and species nonconformity.
2.3. Like or unlike the kind: resemblance and variation
This argument about taking creaturely nomenclature and kind language 
seriously and literally allows us to see the substantive ways in which Niddah 
and Bekhorot treat resemblance and dissemblance as central to questions 
about generation, recalling Greco-Roman discussions of the same. This is 
also an argument for taking the “like” in the recurring “like the kind” (ke-
min) seriously as well. In m. Niddah 3:2b, the scrutiny of the possible fetus’s 
features is very close. Alongside the classificatory terminology of min, the 
Mishnah not only enumerates its tripartite categories of animal kinds, but 
also refers to species (pure or impure kinds). This last detail has no ultimate 
impact on the ruling, but serves to conjure a scanning for split hooves or 
other signs of a particular “kind” or species of animal.68 These details thus 
undo the metaphorical force of the modifier “like” attached to “kind” (e. g., 
ke-min behemah, like a wild-animal kind), weighting the meaning of “like” 
toward one of likeness and resemblance.
The scrutiny is further sharpened according to Rabbi Meir, for whom 
one must assign a sex to the entity, in order to calculate the period of post-
partum impurity. Together these two details of species and gender make for 
a vivid sense of the corporeality and animality of this putative non-living 
fetus. They substantiate the argument that we must take the formula “ke-
min  + creature” as far more than a rhetorical convenience, and instead 
as earnest formal criteria by which material is assessed. This argument 
67 Mary Douglas makes the point that dietary laws pose fundamental questions of 
creaturely classification; M. Douglas, Purity and Danger (London: Routledge, 2010).
68 On signs (simanim) and the purity of species, see m. Hullin 3:7, t. Hullin 3:25–26.
Throughout the Mishnah the term simanim (calque of Greek semeia) means distinctive 
marks or visible means of identification across a range of entities, from objects, to 
determinations of gendered human adulthood, to species determinations (particularly 
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is enhanced when we take into account the many instances of the same 
language in the tractate of Bekhorot that describe cross-species deliveries.69
2.3.1. Human form
The mimetic dissemblances in Niddah and Bekhorot are departures from 
a normative theory of reproduction that would limit it to one kind expel-
ling a like kind (per Pseudo-Aristotle, Problems). The resemblance-based 
notion of reproduction as mimesis is partially expressed in the sages’ view 
that “anything that does not have something of human form (mi-tsurat ha-
adam) is not a valid delivery” (m. Niddah 3:2b). Here the kind is human 
(adam), with the concept of form (tsurah; cf. eidos) infusing the notion 
of reproduction as mimesis with strains of both biblical and Aristotelian 
accounts of generation. However, the notion of human form expressed here 
lacks both the patrilineal mimesis of Gen 5:3 and Aristotle, and the divine 
resemblance of Gen 1:26.70 Instead it is a species marker akin to minimal 
requirements for mimetic resemblance with respect to animal kinds else-
where (e. g., t. Bekhorot 1:9, “its head and the majority of it resemble its 
mother”).
As important as their conceptual apparatus, is the substance of the sages’ 
ruling in m. Niddah: they do, after all, concede that an entity that largely 
looks like a non-human creature (of the domesticated animal, wild animal 
or bird register) delivered by a human may be categorized as a valid delivery, 
as long as it also has “some of ” (mi-) the features of a human.
 2.3.2. Partial and radical dissemblance
These apparently technical disagreements on what variations of flesh con-
stitute a valid delivery reflect differing theories of reproduction and resem-
blance. For Rabbi Meir, an entity that is utterly species nonconforming falls 
within the category of a valid human delivery. He agrees with Aristotle 
(though not with the author of Problems), allowing radically variant, even 
species-nonconforming, entities to count as offspring. This is also the view 
69 See m. Bekhorot 2:5; t. Bekhorot 2:6; t. Bekhorot 1:5, 6, 9 (also t. Kilʿayim 5:3).
70 See Gen 5:3’s patrilineal account of generation, and Generation, 767b–769b for Aris-
totle’s notion of male seed as contributing form. In both Aristotle and Mekhilta de Rabbi 
Ishmael, Beshallah, 8, this patrilineal theory of reproductive mimesis is enhanced by 
the use of artisanal language: the agentive male seed is likened to a carpenter, painter 
and sculptor shaping his material (Generation, 724a 20, 30, 725a 25, 729b 15, 730b 
10–30, 735a 5), and the Mekhilta likens God to an icon painter who shapes the off-













































308 Rachel Neis JSQ 
expressed in the reproductive principle of m. Bekhorot 1:2b. The sages in 
Niddah 3:2b do not accept such an entity as human, but they do accept 
what is effectively a hybrid, i. e. an entity that resembles one of the tripartite 
classes of animal that also bears human elements.71
Where the sages draw the line is with the completely species- 
nonconforming: for them, neither menstrual nor fetal, a body that looks 
like an animal is effectively an unclassified fleshy mass, invisible under the 
halakhic radar (perhaps similar to Problems).72 We may contrast this exclu-
sion in the case of such an entity expelled from a human, with the rather 
different result in the animal case of m. Bekhorot 1:2 in which an entity 
delivered by a radically unlike kind (e. g., a donkey-like kind born of a cow) 
is classed according to its parent’s kind. We can speculate that the difference 
between the two cases  – in Niddah the species nonconforming entity is 
produced by a human, in Bekhorot, by an animal – points to a somewhat 
more restrictive view of the human in these cross-species phenomena in the 
Mishnah. However, as we will see in the final section, the Tosefta softens 
these restrictions (both the sages’ requirement for “something of human 
form” and the reproductive principle).
Regardless of the subtle difference between majority rulings on human 
and animal cross-species deliveries, that the Tannaim lived in a world in 
which degrees of species nonconformity (and thus hybridity) obtained 
is evident in some of the “blemishes” noted in Bekhorot.73 Priests with 
 animal-like features are disqualified from service,74 and animals whose 
mouths look like pigs’ or whose eyes look human are excluded from the 
71 E. g., the adneh ha-sadeh (masters or men of the field) are categorized as hayah, but 
convey corpse impurity according to one sage (m. Kilayim 8:5).
72 This nonliving body thus transmits no impurity: a curious result for a ritual legal 
system that seeks to include the entire material world under its aegis. In many ways 
this accords with Balberg’s characterization of the inverse relationship of flesh to body/
person in the case of corpse material (Balberg, Purity, 96–121, especially p. 110 in 
which Balberg discusses the relationships between human form, the corpse, and the 
fetus), except that here it is not a quantitative issue but a formal one: we have a body, 
but of the “wrong” “kind.” And of course the temporal context differs: this is not a 
body that was once capable of entering the circuit of im/purity that has fragmented or 
decomposed. In a sense it was always already outside of that material economy.
73 For other examples of interspecies births among non-human animals, see Aelian, His-
torical Miscellany,1:29 and Josephus, Jewish War, 6.5.3.
74 Those with eyes “as big as a calf, or as small as a goose” (m. Bekhorot 7:4, t. Bekhorot 
5:3); soles “as wide as a goose” (m. Bekhorot 7:6), breasts that hang “like a woman’s” or 
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altar75 (though even in these cases the priests and animals maintain their 
species identities).
To recapitulate: there are two views of species-nonconforming entities 
that emerge from animals and humans. First: per Rabbi Meir in m. Niddah 
3:2b and the reproductive principle of m. Bekhorot 1:2 (“pure emerges 
from pure”), the species from which the entity derives is determinative.76 
Second, according to the sages in Niddah, there must be some degree of 
likeness to the parent species, meaning that species hybridity is tolerated. 
What to make of these apparently contradictory positions: a relative open-
ness to accommodating radically species-nonconforming deliveries as off-
spring versus more inflexibility with entities emitted by humans? And is 
it a coincidence that the somewhat more restrictive position arises in the 
human case?
3. Distinguishing the human in reproductive biology
How does the human fall into the broader scheme of reproduction, resem-
blance and species variation? This section demonstrates that ultimately 
even efforts to distinguish the human apply the same reproductive princi-
ples that govern non-human kinds, thereby implicating the human as one of 
many creatures and undoing some of its vaunted uniqueness or superiority 
(of the sort based on the image of God). A variation of m. Bekhorot 1:2’s 
reproductive principle in Tosefta Bekhorot, which may on first blush seem 
to distinguish the human, actually fully implicates it in rabbinic biology, 
and Tosefta Niddah makes a dual move of supporting human distinctive-
ness, while undermining it at the same time.
3.1. “Not a human from any of them, nor any of them from a human”
Does the view that refuses to allow radical species-nonconformity for 
entities delivered by humans indicate that humans are exceptions in the 
broader biological scheme (as expressed by the reproductive principle)? 
75 While simile (ke, “like”) is used in some of the animal examples, we also find “the tail 
of a goat that resembles (domeh) that of a pig” (m. Bekhorot 6:9). I thank Clara Bosak-
Schroeder for her insight that there is a difference between saying that a creature has 
eyes “as big as” a calf and saying it has a mouth “like” a pig’s. I think that the human 
cases (such as eyes “as big as a calf ’s”) are more attenuated for being marked as similes.
76 Earlier parts of m. Niddah require that the delivery be of a certain mass or size; a 
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This issue surfaces in t. Bekhorot 1:9, following the introduction of a third 
theory about resemblance, variation, and reproduction by Rabbi Simon, 
who (surprisingly) ventures to classify the cross-species delivery as being of 
the kind that it resembles:
R. Simon says: what does (Scripture) come to teach you by having camel (Lev 11:4) 
camel (Deut 14:7) twice? To include the camel that is born of a cow as if it were born 
of a camel. And if its head and majority resemble its mother’s, it is permitted for 
eating.
Invoking two biblical prohibitions against consuming camels, Rabbi Simon 
uses this duplication to derive that, contrary to the reproductive principle of 
m. Bekhorot 1:2, a camel-like entity is a camel regardless of whence it came 
(and may not be consumed, since camels are not pure kinds). However, 
according to the second clause (perhaps added?), the camel-like creature 
born to a cow may be consumed if its head and most of it are bovine. This 
view is still stricter than m. Bekhorot 1:2, given that it requires partial resem-
blance for the animal to be fit for consumption. Its threshold of likeness to 
parent species (“its head and majority”) is higher than the more minimal 
unspecified requirement by the sages for the purposes of the bekhor (“some 
of its signs”).
This view is immediately opposed by an iteration of the reproductive 
principle that declares that pure kinds emerge from pure kinds (m. Bekho-
rot 1:2). But this version introduces the human into the equation:
And the sages say: that which emerges from the impure is impure, and that which 
emerges from the pure is pure, for an impure animal is not born of the pure, neither 
is a pure animal born of the impure. And not a large one from a small one, nor a 
small one from a large one, and not a human from any of them, nor any of them 
from a human.77
It seems that Rabbi Simon’s declaration motivated the Tosefta to counter 
with a repetition of the sages’ reproductive principle (already cited in 
t. Bekhorot 1:6) in not just positive and but also negative formulations (“an 
impure animal is not born of the pure”). This version of the rule contains 
two significant extensions to both m. Bekhorot 1:2 and to the earlier version 
in t. Bekhorot 1:6: further distinctions among animals and specifying the 
human. It is not only that a genuine camel cannot emerge from a cow (i. e., 
an impure kind coming out of a pure kind), but also that genuine larger 
kinds (e. g., cows) may not be born from smaller kinds (e. g., sheep) and vice 
versa. The phenomenon of kinds delivering offspring that look like different 
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kinds is not in itself negated; this principle simply confirms (contra Rabbi 
Simon) that such offspring are not genuinely of other species.
The attention to the human (adam) here is crucial: it is seemingly set 
apart from “any of them” (kulan) – all the classes of non-human animals 
(pure and impure, large and small). Yet, here too, the sages are not disputing 
the fact that human-animal deliveries may appear to occur; rather, they dis-
agree that such cross-species-appearing births are classified separately from 
their parents. In this respect, we have a direct contradiction to the sages’ 
demand for minimal human form in m. Niddah 3:2.
The Tosefta goes so far as to undermine another explanation for species-
nonconforming deliveries: that they are products of interbreeding. It does 
this by offering an account of the different gestational periods and modes 
across various kinds:
“A pure small domestic animal gives birth at five months; a large pure domestic 
animal at nine months, an impure large animal at twelve months; a dog at 50 days; a 
cat at 52 days; a pig at 60 days; a fox and creeping creatures at six months; the wolf, 
lion, bear, panther, leopard, elephant, baboon and ape at three years; the snake at 
seven years. Dolphins give birth and grow (offspring) like the human; impure fish 
spawn; pure fish lay eggs.”78 (t. Bekhorot 1:10–11)
This conspicuous display of knowledge about modes of reproduction and 
gestation periods of a variety of creatures, right after the expanded repro-
ductive principle, serves as a justifying explanation for why interbreeding is 
not actually possible.
The sequence of reasoning from cross-species resemblances to reproduc-
tive modes and gestational periods echoes both the content and the form of 
Aristotle’s musings in Generation.79 After discussing species nonconformity 
in human and animal cases (including hybrid entities) and dubbing them 
“resemblances only,” Aristotle notes that interbreeding cannot occur, due to 
“widely different” gestation periods, listing those of humans, sheep, dogs 
and oxen.80 The presence in rabbinic texts not only of ideas, but also of 
78 Aristotle grouped kinds according to their “modes of reproduction,” from viviparous 
to oviparous to larviparous (see, e. g., Generation, 732b 15–36). Like the rabbis, he 
believed that certain species could successfully inter-breed (Generation, 738b 28; 746a 
30). For ancient ideas about the affinities between humans and dolphins, including 
reproductive habits and parental affections, see Pliny, Natural History 10, 7–9.
79 Saul Lieberman, “Natural Science of the Rabbis,” in Hellenism in Jewish Palestine (New 
York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1962) 181–193, notes parallels between rabbinic 
“natural science” and Aristotle (among other Greek philosophers), some of which he 
ascribes to contact among peoples in the “Hellenistic Mediterranean world,” and others 
of which he ascribes to local knowledge or observation.













































312 Rachel Neis JSQ 
sequences of ideas deployed in Aristotle’s writing may indicate something 
about the bodies of knowledge circulating in early Roman Palestine. But 
more interesting is the way these ideas about reproduction and variation are 
embedded and transformed amid the broader concerns of Bekhorot.
To return to the question about the place of the human in reproductive 
resemblance and dissemblance: m. Bekhorot 1:2 and m. Niddah 3:2 offer 
seemingly contradictory answers to questions about human implication 
in species nonconformity. While the possibility of nonconforming-species 
deliveries is imagined in both tractates, their classification differs. In m. 
Niddah 3:2, the majority view accepts part-human, part-animal entities 
as human, but not radically nonconforming ones (which are considered 
simply fleshly material, neither human nor animal). This contradicts not 
only Rabbi Meir in the same mishnah, but also the majority view in m. Bek-
horot 1:2, in which the reproductive principle establishes that classification 
of kind looks to (birth) parent. However, even the more restrictive majority 
view of m. Niddah 3:2 does not entail a purist notion of strict identity in its 
understanding of reproduction. Partially resembling entities can still make 
for kind and thus kin.
Looking to Tosefta Bekhorot we find two developments: a third, surpris-
ing, minority view (t. Bekhorot 1:9) that radically species- nonconforming 
deliveries are classed as the kind that they resemble (rather than as the kind 
from which they emerge); and a reiteration of the reproductive principle 
that explicitly marks the human as subject to its purview. Between the 
Mishnah and the Tosefta of these two tractates of Niddah and Bekhorot, 
the human founders between being marked as a special case (though only 
somewhat) and as one among other creatures in which reproductive out-
comes are not always mimetic.
3.2. Secunda Facie
What follows is another example of the Tosefta softening human distinc-
tiveness, this time in its presentation of the dispute between Rabbi Meir and 
the sages:
t. Niddah 4: (5) One who expels something like a kind of domesticated animal, a 
wild animal or bird (is impure) – the words of R. Meir.81 And the sages say: as long 
81 Presenting the Mishnah’s case in truncated form, t. Niddah 4:5 does not distinguish 
between pure and impure kinds or present the Mishnah’s version of Rabbi Meir, which 
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as it has human form.82 R. Hanina son of Gamliel said: the words of Rabban Meir are 
fitting with respect to an animal because the eyeballs of an animal resemble human 
eyeballs, and the words of the sages with respect to a bird, because it does not have 
something of human form.
(6) There was a case of a woman from Sidon who gave birth to a likeness of a raven 
three times, and the case came before the sages, and they said: anything that does not 
have something of human form is not a valid delivery. (7) The facial form83 of which 
they spoke84 can be one of any facial forms, except the ears …
Rabbi Hanina’s harmonistic intervention shifts the terms of the debate 
between Rabbi Meir and the sages by softening the differences between 
them and between animals and humans. It finds common ground between 
them by declaring that domesticated and wild animals are already inherently 
of (sufficient) human form because their eyeballs resemble (domin) human 
eyeballs. The requirement for human form is thereby upheld via the logic 
of resemblance – but in such a fashion as to simultaneously undermine its 
species-formal uniqueness.85 The logics of dissemblance and resemblance 
are thus intertwined.
Rabbi Hanina’s reading effectively narrows the earlier dispute to only 
bird-like cases, out of the original three kinds (domesticated animal, wild 
animal or bird). The case that follows about a habitual (three-time) aborter 
affirms his compromise reading of the dispute, with a ruling in which the 
uterine entity is described as “a likeness of a raven” (demut oʿrev).86 Instead 
of having a human form, this is “like a kind of bird” (ke-min oʿf) and is not 
deemed to have human status.
If Rabbi Hanina highlighted the eyes, t. Niddah 4:7 explicitly declares 
that the focus is the face and its features (tsurat panim). Like “something of 
human form” (mi-tsurat ha-adam) or “its head and majority” (rosho ve-rubo, 
t. Bekhorot 1:9), the Tosefta’s stipulation envisions partial resemblance, i. e., 
82 Following MS Vienna. Editio princeps has עד שיהא בה מצורת אדם.
83 To my knowledge this term does not appear elsewhere in Tannaitic literature. It 
appears in Leviticus Rabbah 33:5 (Margulies ed., 763) as a gloss on m. Yevamot 16:3 
(cf. t. Yevamot 14:7).
84 The Tosefta refers to “the facial form of which they spoke,” as if citing a parallel mish-
nah, but we have no version of the Mishnah with this phrase. It is conceivable that the 
Tosefta elides human form with facial form. It is also possible that it cites a tradition 
that did not find its way into our current version of the Mishnah; on such instances, 
see Judith Hauptman, Rereading the Mishnah (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 37.
85 Compare to the exclusion of an animal from the firstborn obligation for having an eye 
that “is round like that of a human” (m. Bekhorot 6:8; t. Bekhorot 4:11); this contra-
diction is taken up in b. Niddah 23a. See Genesis Rabbah 8:11, where the difference 
between human and animal vision is discussed.













































314 Rachel Neis JSQ 
a cross-species hybrid with a human-like face and an animal-like body.87 
This focus on the face is ostensibly a human-centric move, which is echoed 
in laws regarding corpse identification. For example, m. Yevamot 16:3 stipu-
lates that the testimony about a man’s corpse that allows his wife to remarry 
must be “on the basis of the facial features (partsuf panim), including the 
nose, even if there are (other) signs on his body and his clothes.”88 The con-
cern is not whether the corpse is human, but to identify it as a particular 
person.89 Despite their different aims, these two contexts share a focus on 
the face. Thus the face signifies humanness both generically (as a kind) and 
in particular (as a person). In fact, these two are potentially related notions, 
blended in the idea that humans are the only creatures that possess a face or 
a countenance that is uniquely varied.90
However, Rabbi Hanina’s harmonistic move renders even the focus on 
facial features meaningless. The claim is that animals and humans already 
effectively share facial features (eyes). It is precisely in the requirement for 
a distinction between humans and larger animals (though not birds) that 
their commonality is drawn into relief. The effort to draw humans apart 
ends up folding them in with other kinds.
87 Human form is also a minimal requirement elsewhere: in t. Niddah 4:7 contd. (for a 
kind of flattened fetal entity called sandal); Sifra Tazria, Parashah 1:7 (for a creature of 
undefined head or body, or one of two backs or two spines). A notion of human form 
shapes the ekphrasis of the textured sac in t. Niddah 4:10 and of the requirement that 
deliveries of certain body parts are “incised” versus “stumped” in t. Niddah 4:11.
88 Cf. the more relaxed requirements in m. Yevamot 16:6 and t. Yevamot 14:7.
89 On the relationship between nonliving corpse material, its identification as a person 
and the potency of its impurity, see Balberg, Purity, 96–121. Tracing through the 
graded impurity of various amounts and types of corpse material, Balberg argues that 
it takes certain amounts and types of material to symbolize a (living) person and so 
express the highest kinds of corpse impurity.
90 Herein may lie the significance of m. Sanhedrin 4:5, which claims that despite having 
the same adamic/human seal, individual people do not resemble one another, and 
perhaps also of t. Berakhot 6:5 where the sight of a large crowd elicits a blessing to “the 
wise one of secrets, for their faces do not resemble (domin) one another, and neither 
do their minds resemble one another.” Compare to Pliny, Natural History 7:8: “though 
our physiognomy (facie) contains ten features or only a few more, to think that among 
all the thousands of human beings there exist no two countenances (effigies) that are 
not distinct – a thing that no art could supply by counterfeit in so small a number 
of specimens;” trans. Harris Rackham (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999) 
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Conclusion: Reproduction of kinds
I always knew that if I  turned up pregnant, I wanted the 
being in my womb to be a member of another species; 
maybe that turns out to be the general condition.91
I have argued that descriptions of entities expelled by humans as “like the 
kind” of creature X or Y are not merely fanciful similes or descriptive con-
veniences. Rather, they relate to a robust engagement, in Tannaitic sources 
and in ancient thought more broadly, with the extent to which kinds produce 
like or variant kinds. In the language of mimesis or dissemblance, creaturely 
nomenclature and classificatory terminology, these engagements coalesce 
into a full-bodied theory of generation and mold the tissue of organic sub-
stance into legible kinds and materials: whether human offspring, animal 
kinds, menstrual material or assemblages of flesh that are none of these. 
These designations make for very different outcomes for the living or 
nonliving body concerned. The most glaring difference is the impact on 
a body’s life, death and disposal if classified as nonhuman, particularly in 
its potentially sanctioned ingestion by humans.92 Designation of a body 
as human or nonhuman min or kind carries with it very different ritual 
and legal entailments (not to mention material and affective ones). This 
undeniably speaks to the ways that the rabbinic human claims power over 
lives and bodies of nonhuman beings.
At the same time, the admission of variant bodies as kin and kind 
weakens the project of mimetic resemblance underwritten by the repro-
ductive mechanics of tselem elohim. After all, like other animals, the human 
is capable of conceiving entities that bear likeness to other kinds. The Tan-
naitic gynecological and zoological sources do not espouse a purist notion 
of reproduction that rejects any such variant entity as nonhuman. They 
fail to exhibit a strong commitment to the notion that reproduction must 
always entail complete likeness: the partial or radically unlike can also be 
kind and kin.
91 Haraway, Companion, 96.
92 One noticeable difference between the human cross-species births in M. Niddah and 
the animal ones in M. Bekhorot is the fact the human-delivered uterine materials are 
nonliving and the animal offspring are live. This makes the materiality of the species-
nonconforming entity emitted by a human much more prominent, set as it is among 
the menstrual and other uterine matter. This attention to materiality is part and parcel 
of the first few chapters of Niddah, which scrutinize women’s excreta; it is only in later, 













































316 Rachel Neis JSQ 
Another significant, more direct counter to the claim of human unique-
ness as tselem elohim is in the undermining of “human form”  – itself a 
requirement that could be taken to be a vestigial trace of the tselem elohim. 
This is apparent in the Tosefta in which human-animal distinctions are 
undermined by viewing human-animal features (eyes) as alike. Human dis-
tinctiveness, mapped onto the face (the vaunted singular zone of humanity), 
is thereby mitigated. It turns out that humans and animals are always already 
in hybrid form. This conception of humanness, traced in the lineaments of 
non-living uterine material, is not a matter of sanctity, potentiality, soul or 
even life. And it may involve the matter of animality.
For the ancient rabbis, the material that is human may produce material 
that looks like the non-human. Their careful patterning of the signification 
of uterine material as governed by various kinds of impurity, their delib-
erations over cross-species animal offspring in terms of Temple ritual and 
dietary rules, their reproductive principle that admits deliveries that appear 
as cross-species – all these allow for a biology that is both recognizably of 
its time and yet curiously idiosyncratic. Rather than reading these idiosyn-
crasies as merely localizing, provincializing or “rabbinizing” inflexions of a 
grand imperial science, I have sought to elaborate their substantive concep-
tual implications.
The significance of embedding human embryology into zoology, or by-
passing a mechanics of generation based on replicating the image of God, 
can be highlighted by contrast. Unlike the later Amoraim,93 the Tannaim 
in this strain of interrelated texts paradoxically wrest the human fetus away 
both from the divine artisan/creator and from its tight linkage to the divine 
image. Perhaps they similarly wrest it away from the idealized Greco-Roman 
human that underpins the negatively marked, sometimes racialized, “mon-
ster” that is the hybrid or cross-species offspring.94 While it is “rabbinized” 
(that is, discussed directly by the rabbis), it is the occasion to consider the 
making of kinds (human and otherwise) rather than Jewishness per se.
The work of Gwynn Kessler and Charlotte Fonrobert has illuminated 
the various gendered, political and theological ramifications of rabbinic 
embryological and menstrual sciences. Here, I have treated a related area 
in which the rabbis assume a posture of expertise as they trace the very 
lineaments of the human and other kinds as they come into being. Unlike 
93 See Kessler, Conceiving Israel.
94 Kominko, “Monsters,” 373–389, and Garland, “Invention,” 45–61, show how individual 
cases of reproductive variation (or deviation) were discursively linked to non-Roman-
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Galenic and Plinian reworkings of Aristotle and Hippocrates, the rabbis’ 
way of knowing gynecology and embryology marks certain women and 
their uterine products as Jewish, through mattering them as niddah or 
valad. So, too, the imbrication of animals and humans and the specter of 
cross-species offspring, while not uniquely Jewish, become so (and enter 
Jewish bodies) through the prism of dietary rules. Neither rejectionist nor 
assimilationist, this embryology, gynecology and zoology coalesce into a 
distinctly rabbinic science.
Feminist science studies and animal studies scholar Haraway invokes a 
species-queer fantasy in her work. She does this by implicating – by incor-
porating – the nonhuman into the belly of human generation. The liberatory 
potential of this gesture lies in its rejection of the kinds of mimesis upheld by 
the imago dei (what Haraway calls “the sacred image of the same”95) and its 
interruption of the sexed dualism that founds “the female-defining function 
called reproduction.”96 Haraway’s battle is with “the law of the father”97 as 
a particularly Enlightenment and modernist project, and it is in the name 
of feminist, queer and anti-racist struggle that she embraces the subversive 
human-animal potentials in the technoscientific present.
It is hardly my aim to claim the Tannaim as proto-feminist, or utopian 
posthumanist thinkers. There are surely crucial differences between Hara-
way’s feminist fantasy and the cross-species kinds conjured by the Tannaim 
through their comparison and overlap of women’s and animals’ uterine con-
tents. And yet, as I have shown, this early Jewish approach to the human is 
as much an approach to the nonhuman, and ends up short-circuiting some 
of the kinds of species separatism (and the variously related problems and 
contradictions discussed in the Introduction) implied in tselem elohim. In 
their theory of generation, the Tannaim actively engage human and non-
human kinds and their overlaps, and they (like Haraway) incorporate the 
nonhuman into the human, imagining the gestatory entanglement of both.
95 This is another recurring trope in Haraway, see, e. g., “Promises of Monsters,” in Cul-
tural Studies, ed. L. Grossberg, J. Ratway and J. M. Wise (New York; Routledge, 1992) 
324.
96 Haraway, When Species, 292. For a critical assessment of Haraway’s hybrid vision, 
especially with respect to histories of racist, classist and imperial animalization, see 
Susan Squier, “Interspecies Reproduction,” Cultural Studies 12 (1998) 360–381. Squier 
asks, “While the hybrid is achieving a voice, are women losing ours?” (377) Drawing 
attention to the hybrid’s implicit heterosexuality, the legacies of race/species separatism 
from which it draws, and its historical and current coercive properties (e. g., with 
assisted reproductive technology), she proposes alternative reproductive mechanisms 
(such as contagion).
97 Haraway, “Monsters,” 324.
